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Abstract— Policy-based management provides the ability to 
(re-)configure differentiated services networks so that desired 
Quality of Service (QoS) goals are achieved. This requires 
implementing network provisioning decisions, performing 
admission control, and adapting bandwidth allocation to 
emerging traffic demands. A policy-based approach facilitates 
flexibility and adaptability as policies can be dynamically 
changed without modifying the underlying implementation. 
However, inconsistencies may arise in the policy specification. In 
this paper we provide a comprehensive set of QoS policies for 
managing Differentiated Services (DiffServ) networks, and 
classify the possible conflicts that can arise between them. We 
demonstrate the use of Event Calculus and formal reasoning for 
the analysis of both static and dynamic conflicts in a semi-
automated fashion. In addition, we present a conflict analysis tool 
that provides network administrators with a user-friendly 
environment for determining and resolving potential 
inconsistencies. The tool has been extensively tested with large 
numbers of policies over a range of conflict types. 
 
Index Terms— QoS management policies, Conflict detection, 
Dynamic conflict resolution 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N recent years, policy-based management has been 
proposed as a suitable means for managing different aspects 
of IP networks, including Quality of Service (QoS)  and 
security. Yet despite various research projects, standardization 
efforts and substantial interest from industry, policy-based 
management is still not a reality. There are some vendor tools, 
mostly for virtual private network provisioning, but policy-
based management is still far from being widely adopted 
despite its potential benefits of flexibility and “constrained 
programmability”. One of the reasons behind the reticence to 
adopt this technology is that it is difficult to analyze policies 
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in order to guarantee configuration stability given that policies 
may have conflicts leading to unpredictable effects.   
Although there has been considerable work on analysis of 
security policies, analysis of management policy has received 
comparatively little attention. Initial work in [1] identified 
policy conflicts in policy-based management as being 
analogous to software bugs. Subsequent work [2] focused on 
conflicts related to generic management policies and described 
means to statically detect conflicts, but did not take into 
account policy constraints that restrict the applicability of the 
policies involved. A logic-based approach was therefore 
introduced in [3], which provides advanced reasoning 
capabilities to cope with the emerging requirements of 
complex systems. 
This paper generalizes our initial approach [5, 6], provides 
a comprehensive review of policy conflicts in QoS 
management for DiffServ networks and describes an 
integrated framework for policy analysis, conflict detection 
and resolution. The approach we adopt is based on the work 
presented in [3] where Event Calculus (EC) was proposed as 
the underlying formal representation for policies, systems 
behavior and for the rules that define the conditions that will 
result in conflicts and are therefore used to detect the presence 
of conflicts. In this approach, Ponder policies [7] and design-
level models of managed objects such as state-charts are 
automatically translated to the EC representation to facilitate 
analysis and detect the presence of inconsistencies.  
In contrast to prior work that only used examples from QoS 
management to illustrate specific techniques, we aim here to 
comprehensively cover QoS provisioning policies from 
service management to traffic engineering, and classify 
inconsistencies that may arise between them based on their 
properties. We re-visit static conflict detection in the context 
of service subscription policies and enhance our approach 
towards automating dynamic conflict analysis which can 
trigger conflict resolving policies. Our approach is 
implemented in an integrated tool supporting both static and 
dynamic conflict analysis, which has been extensively tested 
for scalability using large numbers of policies.  
In the next section we present background information 
regarding the QoS management framework we adopt and our 
conflict analysis approach. This is followed by a detailed 
description of the various policies that can be used to drive the 
functionality of individual QoS modules in Section III. 
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Section IV presents a classification of the conflict types 
identified and the conditions under which these conflicts arise. 
Section V elaborates on our conflict analysis approach and 
describes the tool developed. Section VI presents and 
discusses experimental results and analysis examples. Section 
VII reviews the results of this paper in the context of the 
related work in this area and Section VIII presents our 
conclusions and future work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. DiffServ QoS Management Framework 
In order to provide a holistic approach for QoS 
management in DiffServ networks, a range of management 
operations need to be deployed from traffic engineering and 
admission control, to dynamic management of resources. 
Several frameworks have been proposed for this purpose that 
mainly stemmed from European collaborative research 
projects including TEQUILA [8], MESCAL [9], and 
ENTHRONE [10]. All frameworks propose the use of a 
general model depicted on Fig. 1, where the QoS management 
goals are realized by two distinct management blocks: Service 
Management and Traffic Engineering (TE). The former is 
responsible for agreeing the customers’ or peer domain’s QoS 
requirements in terms of Service Level Specifications (SLSs), 
while Traffic Engineering is responsible for fulfilling 
contracted SLSs by deriving the network configuration. 
 
 
The functionality of each of the two sub-systems is realized 
by a two-level hierarchy of modules that reflect the off-line 
and run-time operational mode of the model. On the service 
management side, the SLS-Subscription (SLS-S) module has a 
centralized off-line functionality and performs admission 
control on subscription requests based on resource availability 
provided by the TE system, whereas the SLS-Invocation (SLS-
I) module is distributed across ingress routers and performs 
dynamic invocation of already subscribed SLSs based on the 
network state, following operational guidelines provided by 
the SLS-S. On the Traffic Engineering side, the Network 
Dimensioning (ND) module is a centralized off-line 
component that has a global view of the network. It maps 
forecasted traffic demands onto physical network resources in 
terms of MPLS Labeled Switched Paths (LSPs) and 
anticipated loading for each QoS class on all interfaces, 
providing a long to medium term network configuration. 
Configuration parameters are given in the form of an 
admissible range of values and are used by Dynamic Resource 
Management (DRsM) modules as guidelines for the run-time 
allocation of resources in response to short-term traffic 
variations.    
The dynamic aspects of the architecture are supported by a 
monitoring sub-system that closes the management loop. It 
provides information about the current network state, e.g. link 
utilization, in the form of threshold-crossing alarms that 
trigger dynamic reconfiguration actions.   
B. Approach to Policy Conflict Analysis 
In an environment where a number of policies need to 
coexist, there is always the likelihood that several policies will 
be in conflict, either because of a specification error or 
because of application-specific constraints. It is therefore 
imperative to detect and resolve these conflicts.  
Our approach is based on a identify-classify-detect-resolve 
principle, where an application expert would (a) analyze the 
various policy types governing the behavior of a managed 
system and identify possible inconsistencies that may arise 
among these policies, (b) classify the conflicts based on the 
nature of their occurrence, and, (c) develop techniques and 
mechanisms for their effective detection and resolution. Policy 
conflicts can be characterized by the policy types involved 
and the scope of their enforcement, application environment 
constraints, and the time frame at which they can be detected 
relative to policy enforcement. A classification based on such 
properties/characteristics is vital for the correct design of 
efficient detection rules as well as for the implementation of 
appropriate detection/resolution mechanisms. 
Various conflict types have been identified in the literature, 
at different abstraction levels, spanning from generic policy 
conflicts in distributed systems management [1], [2] to more 
specific ones in the domain of QoS and security management 
[4], [35]. These were broadly classified into modality and 
application-specific conflicts, the former being conflicts that 
can be derived from the policy syntax such as 
positive/negative conflicts and the latter being specific to the 
application i.e., the subjects, targets and actions specified in 
the policy. Whilst for modality conflicts the conditions under 
which the conflicts arise are generic, for application specific 
conflicts these conditions need to be specified and encoded in 
rules that can detect the occurrence of a conflict. These rules 
are also sometimes called meta-policies, although the term is 
overloaded, and may include system-specific data in addition 
to policy information for correctly capturing conflicting 
situations. An instance of system-specific data here are the 
functional dependencies between the QoS management 
modules, which in effect define the scope of a conflict. These 
dependencies are implicit in the hierarchical QoS management 
framework described, where the functionality of the SLS-I 
and DRsM modules is constrained by guidelines provided 
from SLS-S and ND respectively. We can thus distinguish 
between intra- and inter-module conflicts, the former arising 
from policies applying to a single module, and the latter 
Network Monitoring
Service Management
SLS-S
operational
guidelines
Dynamic ResMgmtDynamic ResMgmtSLS-I
notifications notifications
traffic 
demand
resource 
availability
Traffic Engineering
Dimensioning
operational
guidelines
Dynamic ResMgmtDynamic ResMgmtDynamic RsrcMgmt
 
 
Fig. 1.  QoS Management Framework. Two main sub-systems, Service 
Management and Traffic Engineering, each implementing a two-level 
module hierarchy. 
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arising between policies defined for different modules.  
In addition to scope and level of abstraction, policy 
conflicts can also be classified based on the time-frame at 
which they can be detected. Thus we can distinguish between 
static conflicts that can be detected through off-line analysis at 
specification time and dynamic conflicts that can only be 
detected when policies are enforced and depend on the current 
state of the managed system [6]. These factors influence the 
analysis methodology and requirements for dealing with 
conflicts. Static conflicts are typically detected through 
analysis initiated manually by the system administrator; 
conflicts represent inconsistencies between policies and are 
typically resolved by amending the policies. In contrast, run-
time conflicts must be detected by a process that monitors 
policy enforcement and detects inconsistent situations in the 
system’s execution. Resolution must be achieved 
automatically, for example through enforcing resolution rules. 
Lack of automation in the handling of run-time conflicts may 
have catastrophic consequences on the correct system 
operation, especially when managing QoS for delay sensitive 
applications.  
Our conflict analysis approach is based on formal methods 
and derivation that caters for the various conflict types we 
have identified in policy-driven service management and 
traffic engineering. Based on previous work [3] we have 
chosen to use Event Calculus for this purpose as it permits 
representation of events and persistent properties. The 
formalism is used for the representation of both policies and 
the managed system [11], providing a uniform description that 
is amenable to analysis. Analysis relies on specifying 
detection rules to define the conditions for a conflict. As 
discussed in Section V-A&B, resolution for the identified 
static conflicts largely requires human intervention, in contrast 
to dynamic conflicts for which resolution is automated and 
comes in the form of predefined policies. For demonstration 
purposes, the dynamic analysis process developed operates on 
Event Calculus-based models that emulate the behavior of on-
line QoS management modules. 
C. Formal Representation and Event Calculus 
Event Calculus (EC) is a logic formalism for representing 
and reasoning about dynamic systems.  Because it supports a 
time representation that is independent of any events that may 
occur, it provides a particularly useful way to specify a variety 
of event-driven systems. In the context of our work, EC serves 
as the underlying formalism for describing policies and the 
managed system since it has well understood semantics, and 
supports all modes of logical reasoning. 
 Since its initial presentation [12], a number of variations 
have been presented in the literature.  In this work we use the 
form presented in [13], consisting of (i) a set of time points 
(that can be mapped to the non-negative integers); (ii) a set of 
properties that can vary over the lifetime of the system, called 
fluents; and (iii) a set of event types.  In addition, the language 
includes a number of base predicates: initiates, terminates, 
holdsAt, happens, as summarized on Table I. 
This is the classical form of Event Calculus where theories 
are written using Horn clauses. The frame problem is solved 
by circumscription, which allows the completion of the 
predicates initiates, terminates and happens, leaving open 
the predicates holdsAt, initiallyTrue and initiallyFalse. 
This approach allows the representation of partial domain 
knowledge (e.g. the initial state of the system). Formulae 
derived from Event Calculus are in effect derived from the 
circumscription of the EC representation. 
The analysis we wish to perform must determine the 
policies that hold given some preconditions and a sequence of 
events. This involves performing deductive reasoning over the 
Event Calculus based formalism, taking into account rules 
containing applicability constraints for the policies. If we 
ensure that the formal representation conforms to a restricted 
version of normal logic programs – known as stratified normal 
logic programs – it can be shown that the analysis reasoning 
task is P-complete [14].  A stratified normal logic program is a 
program whose rules can be ordered such that for any rule that 
has a negated literal in its body, there is rule before it with that 
literal in the head.  This can be achieved by ensuring that the 
behavioral specification of managed objects does not involve 
self-transitions – a restriction which does not affect our ability 
to model the behavior of the presented QoS management 
framework. 
III. POLICY DRIVEN QOS MANAGEMENT 
QoS management has always been one of the most popular 
application domains of policies since ISPs can realize their 
objectives through flexible programmability with respect to 
offered services and treatment of customer traffic in their 
network. A small number of policies have been defined for 
some of the components of the QoS management framework 
described in the previous section [15]. Here, we provide a 
comprehensive set of QoS management policies and explain 
how their enforcement defines the behavior of the managed 
modules and associated IP DiffServ managed objects. The 
majority of these policies are generic enough to apply to other 
QoS and resource management frameworks, where functions 
for admission control and BW management are essential. 
They are categorized into service management and traffic 
engineering policies and follow the two-level hierarchy of 
Fig. 1. 
 
 
TABLE I 
EVENT CALCULUS BASE PREDICATES 
Predicate Description 
initiates(A, B, T) Event A initiates fluent B for all time > T 
terminates(A, B, T) Event A terminates fluent B for all time > T 
happens(A, T) Event A happens at time point T 
holdsAt(B, T) Fluent B holds at time point T 
initiallyTrue(B) Fluent B is initially true 
initiallyFalse(B) Fluent B is initially false 
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A. Service Management Policies 
The service management functionality is realized by the 
SLS-S and SLS-I modules that perform static and dynamic 
admission control respectively. The main objective of 
subscription logic is to control the number and type of service 
subscriptions, aiming to avoid overloading the network, whilst 
at the same time maximizing subscribed traffic. To achieve 
this objective, the SLS-S module employs managed objects 
that expose a set of methods defining its programmable 
functionality. These methods guide the evolution of the SLS-S 
module in its operation through a number of states represented 
in the state machine diagram of Fig. 2. The transitions 
between these states can thus be managed through policies. 
The SLS-S operation distinguishes two main processes – 
initialization and admission control – during which parameters 
essential for the modules operation are initialized, and the 
actual decision on the acceptance/rejection of new 
subscriptions is taken; the relevant policy actions are 
summarized on Table II.   
 
 
 
 
The first two actions, P1.1 and P1.2, use the notion of 
service satisfaction and quality levels [16] to set the relevant 
parameters per QoS Class (QC) and their values range from 0 
to 1.  Satisfaction parameters essentially define multiplexing 
factors that are used to derive the rates at which a service is 
considered almost and fully satisfied, and quality parameters 
are analogous to the confidence level with which a SLS is to 
enjoy the agreed QoS – quality values close to 1  being 
appropriate for high priority QCs. The example below 
encodes action P1.1 into policy specification following the 
Ponder format [7] and defines the almost satisfied factor for 
AF1 traffic during peak hours. 
 
 inst oblig /policies/sls-s/P1.1 { 
 on    newRPC(); 
 subj  s = sls-sPMA; 
 targ  t = sls-s/servSatisfMO; 
 do    t.setAlmstSatisf(af1, 0.2); 
 when  duration(08:00-18:00); 
 } 
As mentioned in Section II-A, subscription admission 
control is based on resource availability and more specifically 
on a Resource Availability Buffer (RAB) [16] which holds 
aggregated traffic demand of subscribed SLSs on a per Traffic 
Trunk (TT) basis. Policy actions P1.3 set the upper limit – 
subscription upper (SU) – as a percentage of the RAB for 
accepting new subscriptions in a conservative, moderate, or 
risky fashion and define the level of associated risk in 
satisfying the QoS requirements. The acceptance limit is used 
as a constraint when deciding whether to accept or reject a 
request as in the policy example below encoding P1.4, where 
a request is accepted if the aggregated traffic demand is less 
than SU. 
 
 inst oblig /policies/sls-s/P1.4 { 
 on    totalAnticipatedDemandCalced(SLS); 
 subj  s = sls-sPMA; 
 targ  t = sls-s/acMO; 
 do    t.accept(SLS); 
 when  t.getTotalDemand(SLS.tt) < t.getSU(SLS.tt); 
 } 
In contrast to the static nature of the subscription module, 
the service invocation logic is based on run-time events/ 
notifications to regulate the traffic entering the network. The 
policies used here perform dynamic admission control on the 
number and types of active services, as well as on the volume 
and type of traffic admitted into the network. The behavior of 
the SLS-I module as a result of policies is depicted in Fig. 3 
and the relevant actions supported are listed on Table III.  
 
 
The first three actions are invoked by policies during the 
initialization of the module and provide initial values to 
various parameters – P2.1 sets the rates that are thought to 
almost/fully satisfy a service, P2.2 sets minimum (ACmin) and 
maximum (ACmax) parameters of the admission control 
algorithm, and P2.3 defines two thresholds that signal target 
critical (TCL) and very critical levels (VCL) of traffic flowing 
into the network. 
ACSet
thrldsSet
idleACminSet
slsAccptd
slsRejectdSRSet
initialization
P2.1
P2.3
P2.8
P2.8
P2.5
P2.7
P2.6
P2.4
ACmaxSet
AsFsSRSet
P2.2
slsActivated
activt(SLS)
goIdle()
goIdle()
admission
control
 
Fig. 3.  SLS-I module behavior 
TABLE II 
SLS-S POLICY ACTIONS  
ID Policy action Description 
P1.1 setAlmstSatisf(QC, Fctr) 
setFullSatisf(QC, Fctr) 
Sets the almost and full satisfaction 
factors per QC 
P1.2 setQltLvl(QC, OQL) Sets the overall quality level per QC 
P1.3 
setSUConsrv(Value) 
setSUModrt(Value) 
setSURisky(Value) 
Sets the RAB upper limit in a 
conservative, moderate, or risky 
fashion 
P1.4 accpt(SLS) Accepts an SLS subscription request 
P1.5 rejct(SLS) Rejects an SLS subscription request 
 
initialization
admission
control
MFactrsSet OQLSet
idle
accptLimSet
totAntDmnd
Calced
slsAccptdslsRejectd
configuring
SLS
goIdle()
goIdle()
calcAntDmnd(SLS)
registr(SLS)
registr(SLS)
goIdle()
goIdle()
P1.1
P1.2
P1.3
P1.4P1.5
 
Fig. 2.  SLS-S module behavior 
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The run-time operation of the module is triggered by 
threshold crossing alarms and service invocation requests. The 
latter activate policy actions for accepting/rejecting a request 
(P2.4, P2.5), whereas the former initiate a set of actions that 
control the rates of incoming traffic (P2.8) and change 
invocation admission control parameters (P2.6, P2.7). These 
parameters are used as constraints in accept/reject policies and 
essentially define the treatment of new service invocations: 
the closer the aggregate value of current TT utilization and the 
requesting SLS traffic rate to ACmax, the less the chances of 
the SLS being successfully invoked. The example policies 
below encode actions P2.6 and P2.8 to handle the event of a 
TCL threshold crossing alarm. When enforced, they take 
proactive measures to avoid potential congestion built-up, by 
decreasing ACmin – thus decreasing the probability of 
accepting new invocations – and the service rate by 20% and 
10% respectively. 
 
 inst oblig /policies/sls-i/P2.6 { 
 on    TCLAlarmRaised(up, TT); 
 subj  s = sls-iPMA; 
 targ  t = sls-i/servAdjustMO; 
 do    t.decrACmin(TT, 20); 
 when  duration(08:00-18:00); 
 } 
 inst oblig /policies/sls-i/P2.8 { 
 on    TCLAlarmRaised(up, TT); 
 subj  s = sls-iPMA; 
 targ  t = sls-i/servAdjustMO; 
 do    t.decrSR(TT, 10); 
 when  duration(08:00-18:00); 
 } 
B. Traffic Engineering Policies 
Traffic Engineering is responsible for fulfilling the 
contracted SLSs by deriving the long- and short-term network 
configuration. The former is realized by Network 
Dimensioning (ND) that maps the forecasted traffic demand 
provided by SLS-S onto physical network resources in terms 
of MPLS Labeled Switched Paths (LSPs) and anticipated 
loading for each DiffServ QoS class (QC) on all interfaces. 
The policy actions on Table IV guide the functional behavior 
of dimensioning to effectively achieve an optimal 
configuration in terms of network load. 
 
 
The first two policy actions, P3.1 and P3.2, allow an 
administrator to set upper and lower bounds of network 
capacity per QC, and setup explicit paths through which 
specific traffic will be routed. Another function of ND is to 
handle the QoS requirements of the expected traffic in terms 
of delay and packet loss. This process is simplified by 
transforming the delay and loss requirements into constraints 
for the maximum hop count for each traffic trunk. The actions 
P3.3 allow for different strategies in achieving this objective 
with calcHopCountMax being conservative and appropriate 
for high priority traffic. The core component of ND is an 
optimization algorithm and its objective is to find a set of 
paths for which the BW requirements of TTs are satisfied and 
the delay and loss requirements are met by using the hop 
count constraint as an upper bound. This is a non-linear 
optimization problem which is solved by the gradient 
projection method [25]. Action P3.4 sets an upper bound on 
the number of hops the calculated paths are permitted to have, 
and P3.5 defines the number of alternative paths the 
optimization algorithm should allow for every traffic trunk 
that belongs to a specific QC for the purpose of load 
balancing. In the final stages, ND assigns the residual physical 
capacity to the various traffic classes or reduces the allocated 
capacity because the link capacity is not enough to satisfy the 
predicted traffic requirements. Actions P3.6 and P3.7 can 
achieve these objectives with different strategies by explicitly, 
equally or proportionally reducing/distributing capacity 
between the various traffic classes. 
 
The provisioning directives from ND are treated as nominal 
values and are a result of predicted demand. Dynamic TE 
functions are deployed by DRsM that deal with traffic 
fluctuations around the forecasted values in order to optimize 
resource utilization. The DRsM policy actions of Table V 
TABLE IV 
NETWORK DIMENSIONING POLICY ACTIONS 
ID Policy action Description 
P3.1 setNDMin(QC, BW) 
setNDMax(QC, BW) Sets min/max allocation per QC 
P3.2 setupLSP(QC, [Path], BW) Sets explicit LSPs per QC through 
nodes of Path 
P3.3 
calcHopCountMin(QC) 
calcHopCountMax(QC) 
calcHopCountAvg(QC) 
Derives the hop count constraint 
of ND algorithm per QC, with 
different strategies 
P3.4 setMaxHops(QC, HopNum) Sets the maximum number of hops per QC 
P3.5 setMaxAltPaths(QC, [TT], PathNum) 
Sets the maximum number of 
alternative paths per TT 
P3.6 allocSpareBW( ) Distributes spare BW among QCs 
P3.7 redOverBW( ) Reduces over-allocated BW  
 
TABLE V 
DRSM POLICY ACTIONS 
ID Policy action Description 
P4.1 incrAlloc(Link, QC, BW ) Increases allocation per QC 
P4.2 decrAlloc(Link, QC, BW) Decreases allocation per QC 
P4.3 incrThs(Link, QC, BW ) Increases tracking thresholds per QC 
P4.4 decrThs(Link, QC, BW ) Decreases tracking thresholds per QC 
 
TABLE III 
SLS-I POLICY ACTIONS 
ID Policy action Description 
P2.1 setSRAS(TT, Value) 
setSRFS(TT, Value) 
Sets almost/fully satisfied service 
rates per TT 
P2.2 setACmin(TT, Value) 
setACmax(TT, Value) 
Sets admission control min/max limits 
wrt RAB per TT 
P2.3 setTCL(TT, Value) 
setVCL(TT, Value) 
Sets target/very critical level 
thresholds wrt RAB per TT 
P2.4 rejct(SLS) Reject an SLS invocation request 
P2.5 accpt (SLS) Accept an SLS invocation request 
P2.6 incrACmin(TT, Value) decrACmin(TT, Value) 
Increases/decreases admission control 
min parameter of a TT 
P2.7 incrACmax(TT, Value) decrACmax(TT, Value) 
Increases/decreases admission control 
max parameter of a TT 
P2.8 incrSR(TT, Value) decrSR(TT, Value) 
Increases/decreases the service rate of 
a TT 
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manage available resources based on utilization monitoring.  
Utilization monitoring generates events to trigger policy 
actions that increase/decrease resource allocation as well as 
utilization tracking thresholds using absolute (e.g. in kbps) or 
relative values (e.g. as a percentage). The example policy 
below encodes action P4.1 to increase the allocation for AF1 
traffic by 10% on a particular link, in the event of an upper 
tracking threshold crossing alarm. 
 
 inst oblig /policies/drsm/P4.1 { 
 on    drsmAlarmRaised(upprTh, link1, af1); 
 subj  s = drsmPMA; 
 targ  t = drsm/allocMO; 
 do    t.incrAllocRel(link1, af1, 10); 
 when  duration(08:00-18:00); 
 } 
State chart behavior representations of both TE modules 
can be found in [5] and [6].  
IV. QOS MANAGEMENT POLICY CONFLICTS 
Thus far we have described the behavior of the individual 
QoS management modules and provided example policies that 
would be used to manage these modules.  In order to use these 
policies in a running system it is necessary to check that they 
do not conflict with policies already deployed in the system.  
In this section we present the different types of conflict that 
could arise between policies written for different modules in 
the QoS management system. We start by providing a 
taxonomy of the conflict types that have been identified. 
A. Conflict Classification 
We identified a number of potential conflicts related to 
policies that drive the QoS management modules’ 
functionality, and classified them as shown in Fig. 4. 
Although it would be possible to classify these conflicts 
using different characteristics we have chosen to distinguish 
the categories based on their level of abstraction, the 
subsystem in which they occur and their specificity to the 
application domain as we believe these most naturally reflect 
the scope in which they occur. First we distinguish between 
conflicts that are module-independent and those specific to the 
two management subsystems. Module-independent conflicts 
may occur among any of the QoS management policies, whilst 
service management and traffic engineering conflicts are 
specific to the operations supported by the relevant modules. 
The latter categories are further subdivided into conflicts 
relating to policies for individual QoS management modules 
(intra-module), and to policies applying to different modules 
(inter-module). 
Module-independent conflicts represent the simplest forms 
of inconsistency that may arise between policy specifications 
and examples include redundancy, mutual exclusivity and QC 
priority conflicts. Redundancy conflicts may arise because of 
duplicate policies or policies with inconsistent action 
parameters in relation to others and can be detected by 
syntactic analysis. Mutual exclusion conflicts occur between 
policies implementing alternative strategies that realize the 
same goal. Examples of the latter conflict type include SLS-S 
policies for setting the upper limit in the RAB in a 
conservative, moderate, or risky fashion, ND policies defining 
the treatment of spare/over-provisioned BW, and DRsM 
policies managing the allocation on link resources through 
different strategies. The various actions are said to be 
mutually exclusive since there should not be more than one 
directive specifying an operation on a particular managed 
resource. An example of such inconsistency would be 
between a DRsM policy incrementing the resource allocation 
using an absolute value (e.g. 500 kbps) and policy P4.1 of the 
previous section. The conflict will materialize if the two 
policies are triggered by the same event, apply to the same 
link and QC, and have an overlap in the time constraints. 
The relative priorities between traffic classes can cause 
inconsistencies to arise between policies defined on the 
various QCs in the context of any QoS management module. 
These are termed qcPriority conflicts and will materialize if 
the effect of a policy action violates the priority between QCs. 
Figure 4 shows two examples of such a conflict between SLS-
S policies for setting service satisfaction and quality levels 
(P1.1 and P1.2). A multiplex conflict will occur if the 
multiplexing factor of a particular QC is higher than that of 
another QC with lower priority, whereas an oql conflict will 
arise if the quality level of a QC with high priority is lower 
than that of QC with lower priority.  
The above module-independent conflicts, as well as some 
 
module independent
QoS mgmt conflict
redundancy
mutual exclusion
traffic engservice mgmt
ndMaxViolation
ndMinViolation
overAlloc
underAlloc
thrshIncompat
divergActions
dimensioning
hopsExceed
altPathExceed
bwRtViolation
static AC dynamic AC
qcPriority
multiplex
subscrAdmStrg
srMaxViolation
srMinViolation
thrshIncompat
invcAdmStrg
dynamic rsrcMgmt
overAlloc
qcPriority
oql
multiplex
 
Fig. 4.  Policy conflict classification. Blue and green colors denote static and dynamic conflicts respectively. The dotted box 
outline indicates instances of the module-independent qcPriority conflict pertaining to service management policies.  
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of the identified inconsistencies, can be determined through 
static analysis at policy-specification time. Policies governing 
the behavior of online modules, on the other hand, are mostly 
prone to conflicts that can only be detected dynamically at 
enforcement-time as their manifestation depends on the 
current state of the underlying managed resources. The next 
sub-sections describe the various conflicts relating to service 
management and traffic engineering policies and the 
conditions under which they arise.  
B. Service Management Policy Conflicts 
Conflicts specific to our application domain primarily occur 
because of inconsistent attribute values set by policies. It is 
essential that these are individually identified such that the 
exact reason for their occurrence can be defined and 
eventually resolved by a network administrator or in an 
automated manner. 
Conflicts related to the SLS-S module can be detected at 
specification-time and arise between policies governing the 
process of static admission control. As mentioned previously, 
the upper limit in the RAB is a major factor for the decision of 
accepting/rejecting a new subscription request and can be 
defined with different strategies (P1.3): risky, moderate, and 
conservative. A subscrAdmStrg conflict will arise if the 
resulting value of the conservative approach is greater than 
that of moderate, or if the latter is greater than the one 
generated by the risky approach.  Multiplex conflicts occur 
between service satisfaction policies (P1.1) that essentially 
define multiplexing factors used to derive the rates at which a 
service is considered almost and fully satisfied. This 
inconsistency will occur if the multiplexing factor for fully 
satisfied is greater than the multiplexing factor for the almost 
satisfied for the same QoS class, as they are inversely 
proportional to the service rates produced. 
To regulate the traffic entering the network, SLS-I works 
on guidelines provided by SLS-S. These come in the form of 
policies that act as constraints and although harmonizing the 
operation of the two modules, they may cause dynamic 
conflicts that we term inter-module: srMaxViolation or 
srMinViolation conflicts occur when service invocation policy 
actions (P2.8) try to alter the service rate of a specific trunk 
but violate the almost or fully satisfied rate boundaries 
provided by the subscription policy P2.1. Besides activating 
service rate policies, threshold crossing alarms also trigger 
policies that manipulate AC parameters (P2.6, P2.7) aiming to 
provide proactive and reactive control over invoked services. 
The relative position of both thresholds and AC parameters in 
the RAB of each trunk allows the administrator to adapt the 
strategy by which services are admitted to the network and 
potentially avoid the build-up of congestion while maximizing 
resource utilization. Incorrect definition of these parameters 
will lead to an invcAdmStrg conflict that can occur both at 
policy specification-time, but also during system execution as 
AC parameters may be re-calculated on the fly. This 
inconsistency will arise if ACmax is less than VCL, or if ACmin 
is greater than TCL. Lastly, an intra-module static conflict – 
threshold incompatibility (thrshIncompat) – can occur 
between policies setting the threshold values (P2.3) if TCL – 
aiming to trigger some proactive measures – is greater than 
VCL.  
C. Traffic Engineering Policy Conflicts 
Conflicts between policies guiding the functional behavior 
of Network Dimensioning are static in nature and occur due to 
contradicting action parameters of BW allocation and routing 
policies. A divergActions conflict may arise between two 
policies setting the BW allocation boundaries for a specific 
QC (P3.1), if their parameter values do not converge. These 
policies may also cause an overAlloc conflict if the sum of the 
allocation corresponding to all the supported QCs exceeds 
100%. The same rule applies to explicit actions responsible 
for the distribution of spare resources or the treatment of over-
provisioned BW (P3.6, P3.7). HopsExceed conflicts occur if 
the hop count of the path, through which an LSP is set (P3.2), 
exceeds the maximum number of allowed hops specified in 
P3.5, provided both policies apply to the same QC. LSP 
policies can lead to further inconsistencies – altPathExceed 
and bwRtViolation – if their instantiated number is more than 
the one defined by policy P3.5, for the same QC and TT, or if 
the specified allocation exceeds the maximum allowed by 
policy P3.1. 
Conflicts related to DRsM policies are mainly dynamic and 
arise due to ND policies constraining the run-time allocation 
of resources. These are inter-module conflicts and are a result 
of the hierarchical relationship between the two modules 
where policies introduced at the ND level are refined, 
communicated, and executed by DRsM as well. More 
specifically, an ndMaxViolation conflict occurs when policy 
P4.1 tries to increment the allocation for a QC but the 
calculated BW exceeds the upper bound set by the ND 
directive P3.1. Similarly, an ndMinViolation conflict occurs 
when policy P4.2 tries to decrement the allocation but the 
calculated BW is less than the lower bound set by the ND. 
Another high-level directive that is refined down to the DRsM 
level is a general resource management policy, which 
explicitly specifies that during a DRsM operational cycle, the 
full link capacity should be allocated between the various 
QCs. This implies that a DRsM policy action aiming to 
increase or decrease the allocation for a specific QC will 
violate the above rule as the resulting allocation may exceed 
or be less than the link capacity. We term these 
inconsistencies as overAlloc and underAlloc conflicts 
respectively. The last of DRsM related conflicts is an intra-
module conflict and involves policies responsible for the 
computation of new thresholds and allocation of resources. 
The inconsistency arises if the allocated BW is below its 
respective upper utilization tracking threshold, in which case a 
threshold incompatibility (thrshIncompat) conflict should be 
signaled. 
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V. CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND TOOL SUPPORT 
The conflict analysis approach presented in this paper has 
two main aspects: the definition of appropriate rules for 
determining potential conflicts in policy specifications, and 
the effective deployment of analysis processes in the context 
of the managed environment. Detection rules are used to 
describe the conditions under which a conflict will arise and 
include information from policies and the managed 
environment itself to cater for the various QoS management 
conflicts. Although guidance can be provided by the policy 
refinement process for some conflict types – in the case of ME 
conflicts the actions associated with multiple disjunctive sub-
goals should be encoded in a detection rule – their 
specification is a manual process largely relying on the 
knowledge of an expert administrator. Since most of the 
defined policies are generic to a certain extent, re-use of the 
conflict detection rules in other QoS frameworks could be 
possible. A comprehensive set of detection rules together with 
system-specific information is used by the analysis processes 
to determine potential inconsistencies.  
The principal challenges in detecting policy conflicts are 
being able to account for the constraints that limit the 
applicability of a given policy to specific states of the 
managed system and the effects of enforcing policies on the 
states of the managed system.  To achieve this, it is necessary 
to use formal reasoning techniques and formal models of the 
QoS management system behavior, policy enforcement 
mechanisms and the policy rules themselves.  Since the QoS 
management system and the policy enforcement mechanisms 
concerned are event-based reactive systems, we have used 
Event Calculus as the underlying formal representation. In 
addition to having built-in representations for events and 
persistence of properties Event Calculus is a suitable 
formalism because it supports both deductive and abductive 
reasoning.  
Fig. 5 outlines the architecture of our approach. Here, we 
distinguish between static and dynamic analyses as two 
different processes that are executed at different timescales 
and physical locations. Static analysis is an integral part of a 
Policy Management Tool (PMT) and is initiated by a network 
administrator, whereas dynamic analysis runs in a Policy 
Management Agent (PMA) and its execution is based on run-
time events generated by the network/managed system. Both 
processes are semi-automated. In the case of static analysis a 
set of pre-specified rules are used to search the policy space 
for conflicts whose resolution is manual. Dynamic analysis 
also makes use of conflict rules, but the invocation of the 
process and the subsequent detection of conflicts are 
automated. The run-time resolution process is also automated 
and is based on a pre-defined set of policies. The details of the 
two processes are presented in the next sub-sections.  
 
 
A. Static Analysis 
As shown in the upper part of Fig. 5, our approach towards 
static conflict detection is based on the output of a refinement 
process [11, 17], where high-level policy specifications 
introduced by a network administrator are decomposed into 
low-level implementable ones and mapped onto their 
respective EC representation. Before their enforcement, 
policies are analyzed by the static analysis engine, a process 
initiated by a user administrator, by performing comparisons 
on a pair-wise basis. This process makes use of specialized 
detection rules, which are pre-specified by an expert and 
loaded to the engine, but also domain-specific information 
regarding the QoS management modules, to identify 
inconsistencies. 
Based on the identified conflict types, we have defined a set 
of rules expressed in the form of logic predicates that 
encapsulate the conditions to be met for a conflict to occur. 
These predicates are used as conflict fluents in EC notation 
and can be considered as goal states that, when achieved, 
signify the detection of a conflict. The advantage of using 
such a methodology is that, in addition to detecting possible 
conflicts, an explanation as to why a conflict occurred will 
always be provided.  
The conditions for a conflict can either be acquired from 
the policy specification itself but also from domain-specific 
information. The example predicate below is based solely on 
information provided by policies and aims at detecting 
redundancy conflicts by matching certain key parameters as 
well as actions in the policy specification through a pattern 
directed search. The variables of the conflictData term are 
unified during the search if the conditions for a conflict, as 
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Fig. 5.  Conflict analysis architecture. Static analysis is a centralized process 
running within the PMT, whereas dynamic analysis is a distributed process 
integrated within PMAs. 
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defined in the predicate, hold, thus providing all the 
information pertinent to the conflict. 
 
 holdsAt(conflict(redundancy, conflictData(PolID1, 
 PolID2, QC1, QC2, OQL1, OQL2)), T)  
 holdsAt(oblig(PolID1, Subj, op(Targ,  
  Action[Params1])), T) ∧ 
 holdsAt(oblig(PolID2, Subj, op(Targ,  
  Action[Params2])), T) ∧ 
 (numParams(PolID1, PolID2) == 1 ∨ 
  numParams(PolID1, PolID2) >= 2 ∧ 
  intersect(Params1, Params2, Params) ∧ 
  Params \== []) ∧ 
 PolID1 \== PolID2. 
Apart from redundancy conflicts the detection of all other 
inconsistencies requires not only information provided by the 
policy specification but also QoS-specific information, such as 
properties of the managed resources and the supported QoS 
classes. These are encoded in the detection rules as further 
constraints that should not be violated. The example below 
represents the relevant predicate for detecting QoS priority 
conflicts among policies for setting the quality level of traffic 
classes. As described in Section IV-B, this conflict will be 
detected if the defined quality level of a QC with high priority 
is less than that of a QC with a lower priority.  
 
 holdsAt(conflict(qcPriority, conflictData(PolID1, 
 PolID2, QC1, QC2, OQL1, OQL2)), T)  
 holdsAt(oblig(PolID1, Subj, op(Targ,  
  setQltLvl(QC1, OQL1))), T) ∧ 
 holdsAt(oblig(PolID2, Subj, op(Targ,  
  setQltLvl(QC2, OQL2))), T) ∧ 
 ((QC1::priority > QC2::priority ∧ OQL1 < OQL2) ∨ 
  (QC2::priority > QC1::priority ∧ OQL2 < OQL1)) ∧ 
 PolID1 \== PolID2. 
The output of the static analysis process is a set of 
conflicting polices along with an explanation of their 
occurrence [5]. The resolution of these conflicts is a manual 
process that has to be carried out by the user administrator, in 
which policy parameters are modified or, in the case of 
redundancies, policies are eliminated from the system. A 
number of conflict resolution methods aiming to automate the 
process have been proposed in the literature, most of which 
are based on policy priorities [2, 18, 23, 34]. These allow two 
potentially inconsistent policies to coexist within the system 
and involve determining which of the two should prevail in 
the event of a conflict. This is possible due to the nature of the 
conflicts considered for which precedence between 
contradicting policies can be established on the basis of 
modality, specificity, or recency. The static conflicts identified 
in this work however, do not allow for automation in their 
resolution since they mostly occur due to inconsistent policy 
action parameters rather than just actions. Taking the example 
of qcPriority conflicts, consider two instances of policy P1.2 
with which the OQL values associated with EF and AF1 
traffic are set to 0.8 and 0.9 respectively. Resolution of this 
conflict can be achieved by either resetting the OQL value of 
AF1 traffic to be equal or less than that of EF traffic, or vice 
versa. Since there is no clear indication as to which of the two 
strategies to follow, and also because the amount by which the 
OQL will change, for either, QC has an impact on the overall 
QoS provisioning objectives, human intervention is 
unavoidable. The details associated with the inconsistency 
however, can guide the administrator when correcting it. 
B. Dynamic Analysis and Conflict Resolution 
While the analysis process described in the previous section 
is able to deal with static conflicts, some inconsistencies can 
only be detected at policy enforcement time as they depend on 
the current state of the network and the resulting configuration 
output of on-line QoS management modules (SLS-I and 
DRsM). For this reason, the process for handling dynamic 
conflicts needs to be embedded within a PMA which has  
access to the run-time information required.  
Detection of dynamic inconsistencies is still based on a set 
of pre-specified conflict predicates, which, in this case, 
require additional information regarding the run-time state of 
online modules. In the context of our work, the conditions 
under which a conflict will arise are represented by constraints 
that depend on the conflict type. The rules for detecting such 
conflicts are based on the fact that two or more policies violate 
these constraints. The conflict(srMaxViolation, …) fluent 
below is such an example and indicates the violation of an 
SLS-S refined directive defining the maximum service rate for 
a TT. Here, the constraints conveyed to the conditional part of 
the predicate include the specific policy actions with matching 
TT parameters, and the actual value of required rate 
calculated by SLS-I. The latter is represented as an argument 
of the reqSR term and the conditions for a srMaxViolation 
conflict will be satisfied if this value exceeds the maximum 
rate specified by the SLS-S refined policy. Similar rules have 
been defined for all the identified dynamic conflicts relating to 
both SLS-I and DRsM policies [6].  
 
 holdsAt(conflict(srMaxViolation, conflictData(PolID1, 
 PolID2, TT, SRFS, SR)), T)  
 holdsAt(oblig(PolID1, Subj, op(Targ,  
  incrSR(TT, Value))), T) ∧ 
 holdsAt(oblig(PolID2, Subj, op(Targ,  
  setSRFS(TT, SRFS))), T) ∧ 
 reqSR(TT, SR) ∧ SR > SRFS. 
Despite the fact that the resolution of static conflicts is 
performed manually, this process takes place before policies 
are deployed in the system and does not impose any run-time 
overheads on the functionality of on-line modules. Dynamic 
conflicts however, require system components to both detect 
and resolve conflicts in real-time, without degrading the 
performance of the system.  This has been the main 
motivation behind our dynamic analysis approach, which aims 
at automating the triggering of the detection process and the 
handling of conflicts at run-time. 
Unlike other resolution methodologies [2, 18, 23], our 
approach does not involve identifying which of the conflicting 
policies will prevail based on their relative priority, but 
provides separate resolution rules that handle potential 
inconsistencies. These rules are effectively obligation policies 
which are pre-specified by the administrator using the Ponder 
format and their triggering events are conflict occurrences 
rather than network events. Although less automated than 
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precedence-based solutions where resolutions do not require 
to be defined prior to analysis, our approach is more flexible 
since: (a) it overcomes the problem where precedence cannot 
be established, and, (b) custom resolution rules can be 
provided for handling different conflicting situations that may 
arise. Once created, resolution policies are translated to their 
respective EC representations and communicated to the PMA, 
as shown on Fig. 5, where they are stored in a local cache 
repository. They are triggered by events generated by the 
dynamic analysis engine and their enforcement results in 
resetting the system into a state in which a conflict is resolved.  
It is evident that dynamic conflicts arise as a result of a 
change in the state of a managed module, which in turn is 
caused by the enforcement of a new policy. To enable the 
automatic deployment of the analysis process, the latter needs 
to be notified of such events. This is achieved by processing 
the detection rules a priori and extracting information about 
policy actions that can potentially cause a conflict when 
enforced. These are encoded in the first field in the 
conditional part of detection predicates as in the 
srMaxViolation example, and are used to configure the Event 
Handler of Fig. 5. When the latter intercepts a policy 
enforcement event matching an action that can potentially lead 
to a conflict, the analysis process is notified and detection is 
initiated for that specific conflict. If the latter materializes, the 
resolution logic of Fig. 5 enters a resolving state which 
performs a search in the cache repository for a possible 
resolution pertaining to the detected conflict. If an appropriate 
resolution policy is identified a notification is passed back to 
the Event Handler which in turn triggers the enforcement of 
the resolution. 
In contrast to the identified static inconsistencies, one of the 
two policies involved in a dynamic conflict acts as a 
constraint, the violation of which is the very reason for the 
occurrence of that conflict. The use of resolution policies is 
enabled by the fact that the constraining value can be 
considered as the “strong” value and is therefore used to 
quantify the relevant parameter in a resolving policy action. 
Extending the example of the srMaxViolation conflict, the 
resolution policy below sets the service rate to the maximum 
permissible value defined by the relevant SLS-S directive. The 
resolving value, SRFS, can be acquired from the parameters of 
the SLS-S policy on the fly – as this quantifies the relevant 
variable in the conflict predicate – and instantiate the 
associated parameter in the resolution policy action. The latter 
can be re-used for multiple occurrences of the same 
inconsistency alleviating the need for human intervention. 
Furthermore, since the resolution rules are part of the formal 
description, the analysis engine can determine which 
resolution policy applies for a particular conflict predicate 
based on the information provided for that conflict.  
 
 initiates(sysEvent(conflDetected(srMaxViolation,  
 conflictData(PolID1, PolID2, TT, SRFS))), 
 oblig(resPol1, slsiPMA, op(servAdjustMO, 
  setSR(TT, SRFS))), T). 
The work in [33] describes an alternative approach for the 
handling of dynamic inconsistencies and follows the 
validation principle of [32]. The authors propose the use of 
constraints to prevent a policy from firing if a new 
configuration parameter is not consistent with an associated 
system variable. Although this approach can prevent a run-
time conflict, it may also prevent the system from making a 
potentially essential reconfiguration to meet an SLS 
requirement. Consider, for example, the fully satisfied service 
rate (SRFS) of a trunk to be 100Mbps, and a policy that 
increases the rate allocated to that trunk by 20% when 
executed: if the policy triggering condition is met when the 
current allocation is at 90Mbps, the constraint will prevent the 
policy from firing and as a result the rate allocation will 
remain unchanged. Our approach overcomes this problem and 
allows for the correct configuration of resources, which, in 
this case, is the maximum permissible value of SRFS. A 
practical example of the run-time analysis process is 
demonstrated in Section VI-B. 
C. Conflict Analysis Tool 
The proposed analysis techniques have been developed and 
integrated into a policy conflict analyzer. This tool 
implements static and dynamic analysis engines based on 
Prolog and its deductive reasoning capabilities, supports 
Ponder policy specifications and has mapping capabilities to 
formal representation, integrates emulated execution 
environments of online QoS modules, and provides a conflict 
analysis user interface (Fig. 6).  
Static analysis implements the various conflict types 
identified in Section IV and takes as input Ponder policies that 
have been previously converted into the Event Calculus 
representation. The reasoning engines iterate through the 
policies to match the conditions specified in EC conflict rules, 
and outputs a set of conflicting policy pairs, along with an 
explanation of their occurrence. For demonstrating our 
dynamic analysis approach, the tool integrates a run-time 
execution environment that emulates the behavior of online 
modules through state machines. This is an Event Calculus 
based model of the system which allows the enforcement of 
policy actions and can also generate user-defined events about 
emerging network conditions. This is a temporary placeholder 
serving experimentation purposes; we plan to hook our 
dynamic analysis engine with the real execution environment 
in the future. Dynamic reasoning engines interface with the 
run-time environment through an event handler, which 
provides a two-way notification service, allowing for an 
efficient and automated run-time analysis process, including 
detection invocation, and conflict resolution. 
The user interface consists of three main panels 
corresponding to static, dynamic analysis, and presentation of 
results. The first allows the user to initiate detection queries 
for static conflicts choosing among different inconsistencies to 
look for, whereas the dynamic panel allows the user to interact 
with the run-time environment by entering network events 
which can trigger the detection and resolution of potential 
conflicts. Lastly, the analysis results panel is shared by both 
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processes and displays the output of conflict analysis by 
mapping the EC format in a user friendly representation. The 
example of Fig. 6 depicts the results of statically detecting 
qcPriority conflicts among SLS-S policies. A demonstration 
of the capabilities of the tool involving dynamic analysis is 
provided in the next section. 
VI. CONFLICT ANALYSIS TOOL EVALUATION 
This section presents the results of a number of experiments 
conducted to evaluate the performance, scalability, and correct 
operation of the static and dynamic analysis engines 
developed. All experiments were performed on a Centrino 
Duo 2GHz processor with 2GB of RAM, and subject of the 
conflict analysis were service management policies. 
A. Conflict Detection Performance Analysis 
The main aim of the performance evaluation experiments 
concerning static conflict analysis is to determine the relative 
times taken to detect inconsistencies among varying numbers 
of policy specifications. Performance is primarily influenced 
by the evaluation of a conflict predicate in terms of: (a) the 
cost in evaluating its conditions, and (b) the number of times it 
is evaluated. Since experimentation showed that the number of 
conflicts only has a minor impact on performance, the 
experiments described below consider the number of policies, 
their type, and QoS-specific information as the main factors 
affecting the evaluation of conflict predicates.  
Experiment 1 
To investigate the impact of policy types in the analysis, a 
module-independent conflict is required which can detect the 
same inconsistency among different policy types and can 
ultimately provide a uniform basis upon which to compare 
performance. As such, this experiment concerns redundancy 
conflicts detected over different numbers of policies. In the 
first case only one policy type is used – for setting the quality 
level of a single QoS class. The number of conflicts, although 
not having a substantial impact on the performance, is kept 
constant as the number of policies is varied. The number of 
times the conflict predicate is evaluated is defined by the 
number of policies since the detection process iteratively 
compares each policy with the rest in the set. This can be 
quantified by equation (1) below, where L is the number of 
policy types, and Nl is the number of policies of a particular 
type. 
     NN l
L
l
l ×
−
∑
=1 2
1
 (1) 
Fig. 7 demonstrates the performance of the detection process 
where the execution time grows quadratically with respect to 
the number of policies, namely O(N2). As suggested by (1), 
for 2500 policies of a single type the detection predicate is 
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Fig. 7.  Redundancy conflicts – detection performance against number of 
policies with varying policy types. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Conflict analysis tool interface, with three main panels corresponding to static analysis, dynamic analysis and presentation of 
results. Here we show an example of analyzing 1000 policies for static conflicts and display the details of a QoS class priority conflict 
among SLS-S policies that set the quality level of EF and AF1 traffic classes.  
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evaluated 1999×103 times, which takes 39 seconds. 
Introducing more policy types, e.g. for setting service 
satisfaction factors and the upper limit in the RAB, the 
performance is significantly improved as the number of 
comparisons decreases, with all the conditions in the detection 
predicate only being fully evaluated when matching policy 
actions are found. For 2500 policies of two and three types, 
there is a performance improvement of 49% and 66% 
respectively. These results are validated against the theoretical 
gain provided by (1), which is 50% and 67%.   
Experiment 2 
Another factor that influences analysis performance is 
application-specific information. This is particularly important 
when dealing with QoS management conflicts whose 
occurrence depends on such information, as for example the 
number of QoS classes supported and their impact on 
determining qcPriority conflicts among SLS-S policies setting 
the service quality level. Equation (2) below can be used to 
calculate the number of times the relevant predicate is 
evaluated when detecting such conflicts, where M is the 
number of QCs involved, L is a counter equal to M-1, and Nl 
and Nm are the number of policies setting the quality level of 
particular QCs. For an example scenario involving three QCs, 
EF, AF1, and BE, policies setting the OQL of EF traffic are 
compared against the ones for AF1 and BE, and those for AF1 
traffic against the ones for BE. It can be shown that 
(N1×N2)+(N1×N3)+(N2×N3) comparisons are performed, 
where N1, N2, and N3 represent the number of policies 
associated with each QC. 
                                  NN m
L
l
M
lm
l∑ ∑
= +=1 1
 (2) 
Although of the same complexity of O(N2) as the previous 
experiment, the detection process for this conflict type is more 
expensive, as indicated  by Fig. 8, especially with an 
increasing number of QCs. The experimental results indicate 
an increase of 35% in detection time between two and three 
QCs, and 53% between two and four, which are comparable 
to theoretical values of 33% and 50% obtained by (2) 
respectively.  
 
 
Experiment 3 
The last experiment compares the performance of various 
detection predicates. To provide a meaningful comparison this 
experiment involves a set of policies of the same type which is 
prone to more than one inconsistency. We consider 
redundancy/qcPriority conflicts among service quality 
policies for two QCs, and redundancy/multiplexing conflicts 
between almost and full satisfaction factor policies also for 
two QCs. In the first case the performance of the qcPriority 
predicate is substantially worse than that of redundancy by an 
average of 52% over a range of 3000 policies (Fig. 9), despite 
the fact that it is evaluated half as many times based on 
equations (1) and (2). This demonstrates the simplicity in 
detecting redundancies involving the matching of policy 
actions, and the cost associated with determining relative 
priorities between potentially conflicting QCs.   
 
 
The performance in detecting multiplexing conflicts is the 
most efficient with nearly 100% gain when compared to a 
redundancy analysis on the same set of policies. Equation (3) 
below can be used to calculate the number of multiplexing 
predicate evaluations, where L is the number of QCs, and NAS 
and NFS are the number of policies for almost and full 
satisfaction factors of a specific QC.  
                                 NN FS
L
l
AS∑
=1
 (3) 
For 2500 policies – NAS = NFS = 625 for each of the two 
QCs – equation (3) results in 781250 predicate evaluations, 
which is achieved in 9.7 seconds, whereas double the number 
of comparisons are required to determine redundancy conflicts 
in 19.6 seconds.  
The last experimental result in Fig. 9 concerns the 
sequential execution of all three conflict rules, where half of 
the policy set consists of service quality policies and the other 
half is equally split between policies for almost and full 
satisfaction factors; 2 QCs are involved. The combined 
performance is better than two of the individual predicate 
evaluations, which is attributed to the policy set and the 
decreased number of predicate evaluations. The number of 
policies associated with the expensive qcPriority conflict, for 
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example, has halved resulting to a 75% decrease in 
evaluations of the relevant predicate. 
B. Dynamic Analysis and Emulated System Behavior 
As mentioned previously, the analysis tool developed 
interacts with the emulated dynamic behavior of online 
modules by enforcing policies to anticipate emerging 
conditions regarding the network status and eventually handle 
potential inconsistencies at run time. In contrast to static 
detection, dynamic analysis aims at discovering a single 
inconsistency at a time and enforcing the appropriate 
resolution policy. For this reason, searching the entire policy 
space for a conflict may not be required, thus improving the 
detection performance in comparison to static analysis. The 
evaluation of this approach, in addition to performance, is in 
terms of correct functional behavior in the event of a conflict.    
To demonstrate the functionality of the dynamic analysis 
engine, we consider a scenario involving the SLS-I module, 
which is loaded with 100 policies, and concentrate on   
managing the service rate of a specific TT. The current 
allocation for this TT is 120Mbps with the almost and fully 
satisfied service rates set by SLS-S policies at 100Mbps and 
150Mbps respectively. The screenshot on Fig. 10 shows the 
response of the analysis engine when an upper threshold 
crossing alarm is received. 
 
 
The analysis process is initialized at T=0, at which point it 
goes through any loaded conflict specifications and extracts 
policy actions that can potentially cause a conflict when 
enforced. These actions are registered in the event handler 
which can in turn notify the detection engine upon events that 
activate such actions. In the example above, two such actions 
are extracted from conflict predicates relating to service rate 
violations. At T=1 the threshold alarm triggers a policy for 
decreasing the service rate by 25% down to 90Mbps, which 
activates the detection engine for a potential srMinViolation at 
T=2. The conflict materializes and the resolution engine is 
activated at T=3, which first determines and then triggers the 
appropriate resolution policy for this conflict type. At T=4 this 
policy is enforced configuring the service at the minimum 
acceptable (almost satisfied) rate. The cycle is completed with 
the analysis process going to idle state at T=5 consuming not 
more than 10ms. The delay introduced can be argued as being 
acceptable, even for the strict requirements of EF traffic, as 
long as conflicts do not occur extremely frequently. The lower 
part of Fig. 10 shows the specifics of the detected conflict 
including an explanation of the inconsistency, the policies 
involved, and the resolution enforced. 
VII. RELATED WORK 
There has been considerable work on security policy 
conflict analysis over a number of years [20, 21, 26, 27] but 
interest in management policy conflict analysis is 
comparatively recent although increasing.  The authors in [2] 
identify and classify a number of application-specific conflicts 
and describe the conditions under which they occur. They 
provide a methodology for their detection and resolution, the 
latter being the most popular approach in the literature, where 
policy precedence rules are used to define which of the 
conflicting policies is to prevail after a conflict has been 
detected. A similar approach is employed in [36] and [37] 
where different metrics have been used to establish 
precedence among policies including time, role, specificity, 
modality and numerical priority. The last method is also used 
in [19], which targets system management policies. This is 
part of a ratification process where new policies are approved 
before being committed in a system. The authors identify that 
meaningful numerical priorities are notoriously difficult for 
users to assign and may result in arbitrary priorities which do 
not really reflect the importance of policies. For this reason, 
they developed algorithms to automatically assign the priority 
values to new policies and to adjust the values of related 
policies when given only the relative priority of a new policy. 
The algorithms implement the conflict resolution module of 
the IBM’s PMAC platform by maintaining ordered lists under 
policy insertion and deletion operations. Although resolution 
based on precedence may be useful in some occasions, we 
believe that this may not be a flexible solution to the problem, 
especially when application-specific environments are 
concerned, as demonstrated in some of our examples where 
new policies need to be enforced. 
There are few conflict analysis examples that target specific 
application domains. The authors of [4], [20], [21], and [22] 
 
Fig. 10.  Analysis example of a dynamic conflict: detection and resolution. 
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have focused on techniques for analyzing legacy firewall 
policies for networks with centralized and distributed 
firewalls. All possible firewall rule relations are formally 
defined and are used to identify and classify policy conflicts 
(anomalies). Their resolution is based on the relative ordering 
of rules in a filtering policy and a degree of automation is 
proposed for some conflict types by removing or re-ordering 
rules. The main shortcomings of these approaches is the 
dependence on low-level legacy firewall policies to perform 
anomaly detection, the lack of explanations as to how and 
why conflicts occur, and failure to address possible 
inconsistencies that may arise at run-time.   
Another application domain for which conflict analysis has 
been addressed is that of telecommunications and more 
specifically call control. In [29] the authors identify the 
analogy between policy conflicts and feature interactions, and 
provide a taxonomy of conflicts that is based on five principle 
dimensions. Depending on the manifestation of the various 
conflicts, they identify different approaches that could 
potentially be used to detect and resolve conflicts, which are 
based on techniques previously applied on feature 
interactions. This work is extended in [30] where specific 
resolution processes are proposed to handle call control policy 
conflicts both in centralized and distributed settings. The 
methodology is similar to the one presented in this paper and 
is based on the notion of resolution policies. The detection of 
conflicts however is not supported by a separate process, but 
the various conditions are encoded within resolution policies 
instead. Resolution specifications can thus become complex 
and their evaluation quite expensive. This work lacks 
assessment data which could evaluate the performance of the 
proposed approach. 
Recent work in [35] targets the same application domain as 
the one considered in this paper. Here, the authors identify 
conflicts among policies managing QoS in DiffServ networks, 
but only tackle a small portion of the problem regarding 
resource management at the router level. The policies 
involved in this process define the treatment of a traffic flow 
on network nodes by setting parameter values for BW 
allocation, queue size, drop method, and priority for the 
various Per-Hop Behaviors (PHBs). Inconsistencies among 
these policies are classified according to the scope in which 
they occur: intra-PHB conflicts arise within the flow 
properties at a specific node and inter-PHB conflicts occur 
between policy definitions across different nodes. 
Motivated by the advantages provided by information 
models in representing managed entities, such as platform and 
protocol independency, the authors in [38] propose their use 
in the process of conflict detection. More specifically, this 
work is based on the DEN-ng model [40], which, apart from 
managed entities, is also used for representing both the 
policies and the conditions under which these may conflict. 
This work has recently been extended in [39] to support the 
overall methodology and implementation of the conflict 
detection approach. Here, the authors describe a two-phase 
analysis algorithm, which when querying an information 
model, firstly determines the relationships between a pair of 
policies and secondly, applies conflict patterns to determine if 
the policies should be flagged as conflicting. Policy 
relationships are expressed in terms of policy subjects, targets 
and actions, while conflict patterns concern constraints 
defined in the information model describing policy 
relationships that must hold for a conflict. Determining a 
conflict involves transforming the above information into 
matrices and performing comparisons. The use of information 
models is also proposed by Kempter in [41], where invariants 
extracted from the models are used as indicators for conflicts 
when they are breached. Although this approach benefits from 
the inherent advantages of information models, XML 
representation of policies and conflicting conditions can 
become very verbose thus posing a cumbersome task for a 
network administrator if a manual change is required. 
Furthermore, the use of matrices in [39] limits the definition 
of relationships to the core fields of a policy. As such, 
conflicts that arise as a result of inconsistent action 
parameters, rather than actions, are difficult to detect and the 
exact reason for their occurrence cannot be provided. 
Among the many alternative approaches to policy 
specification, there are a number of proposals for formal, 
logic-based notations. In particular, logic-based languages 
have proved attractive for the specification of security policy, 
as they support a well-understood formalism, amenable to 
analysis. However, they can be difficult to use and are not 
always directly translatable into efficient implementation. One 
such example is the Policy Description Language (PDL) [28], 
which is used for the specification of obligation policies. The 
language can be described as a real-time specialized 
production rule system to define policies. Later work by 
Chomicki [31], extends PDL to include the concept of action 
constrains, which are policies that prevent a specified action 
from being performed in a given situation. This work 
introduces the idea of using a policy monitor to detect conflict 
situations and resolve them by either suppressing the events 
that could lead to a conflict or overriding the conflicting 
action. Another work that proposes the use of logic-based 
specification of policies is [27]. The language proposed has 
relatively simple, well-understood semantics and policies are 
analyzed using deductive reasoning techniques. Resolution of 
potential conflicts among authorization policies relies on the 
use of precedence rules.  
Work on computational efficiency for conflict detection and 
resolution mechanisms was presented in [23] and [24]. The 
authors identified several conflicts that may occur in open 
distributed systems and classified them into static and 
dynamic. Their detection mechanism involves identifying and 
predicting all possible conflicts at compile-time, based on 
knowledge of the temporal characteristics of the policies in the 
specification. In the case of dynamic conflicts the relevant 
conditions are stored in a database and subsequent monitoring 
of system events can lead to determining the occurrence of a 
conflict. Furthermore, they developed an approach as to when 
it is appropriate to resolve conflicts. Based on the fact that a 
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resolution process can be computationally intensive, they 
proposed different approaches according to the likelihood of a 
conflict occurring and the cost of resolving that conflict. The 
actual resolution methodology presented by the authors 
follows the guidelines provided in [2], where policy 
precedence rules are being used. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented our approach towards policy conflict 
analysis based on the formalization and reasoning provided by 
Event Calculus and its application in the domain of DiffServ 
QoS management. The subject of the analysis techniques 
presented here is a set of management policies that can be 
used to influence/control the behavior of key modules in the 
process of QoS provisioning. The various inconsistencies that 
can arise between these policies have been identified and 
classified based on their characteristics, which are used to 
describe the reasons and the conditions under which a conflict 
will arise. 
 We define conflicts that can occur between policies applied 
to a single management module (intra-module), or between 
policies specified for different modules (inter-module) as a 
result of their hierarchical relationship, but the main 
characteristic distinguishing between conflicts is the time-
frame at which they can be detected. This has driven the 
design and specification of two different methods to address 
the issues associated with the analysis of conflicts that can be 
detected statically, at policy specification-time, and those that 
can only be determined dynamically, during system execution, 
based on feedback regarding the current state of the managed 
system. These techniques have been implemented and 
integrated in a conflict analysis tool aiming to provide a 
network administrator with a usable interface through which 
to interact with the management system and perform both 
static and dynamic consistency checks. 
Our implementation is heavily based on the use of Event 
Calculus for which we provide seamless and efficient 
mapping mechanisms used by the analysis engines. Its use 
allows the use of advanced reasoning methods and provides 
the means to not only identify a conflict but also provide an 
explanation as to how that conflict occurred. This is 
particularly important when guiding a network administrator 
to handle inconsistencies requiring manual resolution, as in 
the case of the static conflicts identified. To satisfy the 
requirements of dynamic conflicts with respect to efficiency, 
we concentrated in providing an automated run-time analysis 
process. This can be automatically invoked based on run-time 
network events, can provide a resolution if a conflict 
materializes, and also instruct the appropriate entity for the 
enforcement of that resolution. The latter is in the form of pre-
defined policies that are generic enough with only few 
required per conflict type to cater for multiple occurrences of 
the same inconsistency. Finally, the tool developed has been 
used to perform extensive experiments through which it was 
possible to identify the main reasons that influence the 
performance of the analysis engines. 
The future directions of this work are in the domain of 
collaborative QoS management, where neighboring network 
providers set-up service-level agreements aiming to create an 
end-to-end chain for the delivery of QoS sensitive 
applications. We envisage the negotiation process to be one 
where each provider tries to force its own policies in terms of 
requirements and objectives resulting in conflicting situations. 
A collaborative negotiating process would act as a mediator 
where an optimal solution, satisfying both entities, would be 
achieved through conflict analysis. 
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